The Inside Game: By Hugh S. Fullerton

Diamond showing territory covered by infielders on grounders and low balls—calculations the same as in the photographs of diamonds on pages 4 and 6, viz., velocity of balls, one and a half seconds per hundred feet, players moving fifty yards in six seconds—and territory covered by outfields—calculations on the basis of fly balls remaining in the air three seconds, each fielder covering fifty yards in six seconds, allowance made for starting sometimes by spoken words that are meaningless to anyone else—by which they understand which one is to take throws at second base.

The manager also has his private set of signals by which he directs the movements of the team. Each man on the defensive infield has at least nine signals he must remember, most of which are changed, in meaning at least, every day. Each batter has six, three with the three preceding batters and three with the three men following him, making fourteen signals a day, besides the ones used by the manager. The second baseman and short stop have from 20 to 24 signals to keep in mind, most of which are changed every day and sometimes three times during a game. Last season, when the hint had gone through the American League that the New York team was stealing signals, the Chicago White Sox changed signals nine times in one game, no signal meaning the same thing in any two innings.

There is no betrayal of secrets to explain how these signals are used or what they are, since they are changed so often that they may mean anything. Chance usually signals for a runner to try to steal by changing places with some one on the bench. He orders hit and run plays by looking over the bats. He orders double steals by lifting his cap and sometimes varies this by using the names of players. If he calls "Sheckard" he means "steal," if "Schulte," "hit and run," if "Hofman," "go on the first ball."

Trained watchers at baseball games, men who have scored and reported hundreds of games, seldom observe the signals or understand what is happening. Last summer one of the Chicago players, in defiance of Chance's orders, insisted upon remaining at first base after receiving an order to steal. Possibly the runner thought the opposing pitcher had caught the signal and was watching him too closely. Whatever the reason, he did not run. The batter allowed two strikes to go over without moving to hit the ball. The crowd was howling at the batter, who was obeying orders, and the batter happened to be Steinfeldt, whose name that day was being used as the signal to steal. Chance was yelling: "Steinfeldt," "Steinfeldt," "Steinfeldt," at the top of his voice and a veteran baseball man remarked: "What is Chance yelling at Steiny for? He's playing the game. He ought to yell at that lobster on first."

But the signals used in attack have nothing to do with infield defensive work beyond showing how complicated the system is and how much the players must remember.

This infield defense involves much beyond knowing the signals. Its primary object is to enable the players to start before the ball is hit, as half the time required to reach a ball fifteen feet to one side is occupied in starting. It is an odd fact that some men can run faster to the right than to the left, and that others are speedier moving to the left. The short stop and second baseman should be men who can go both ways, but the short stop must go faster to the right and the second baseman faster to the left. Combine two men of that kind, who also can move straight forward rapidly, and the foundation of a good infield is set. The faster the second baseman can go to the left, and the short stop to the right, the closer they can play to second base, reducing the gap there without widening the others. The strength of arm in the short stop is another important factor of closing the gaps, for the deeper he can play the